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CULPABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Kit Kinports*

ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the Supreme Court’s use of the concepts of culpability
and deterrence in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in particular, in the opinions
applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The contemporary Court
sees deterrence as the exclusionary rule’s sole function, and the Article begins by taking the Court at its word, evaluating its exclusionary rule case law on its own terms.
Drawing on three different theories of deterrence—economic rational choice theory,
organizational theory, and the expressive account of punishment—the Article analyzes
the mechanics by which the exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional searches and
questions the Court’s recent decision to incorporate the culpability of the police officer
into the deterrence calculus. Given the empirically speculative nature of the deterrence
inquiry, the Article then pushes back on the Court’s one-dimensional emphasis on deterrence, comparing other areas where law has a deterrent aim and finding that they—
like the Court’s earlier version of the exclusionary rule—are designed to serve other
interests as well. The Article concludes that balancing other non-deterrence goals in
determining the reach of the exclusionary rule would eliminate the need to focus exclusively on the intractable questions surrounding deterrence and thereby help inform
the structuring of the remedy.
INTRODUCTION
By this point, the regrettable state of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence comes as no surprise to anyone. Academics and jurists of all stripes agree
that the Court’s case law in this area is a mess.1 In part, this state of affairs reflects the
* Professor of Law and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn State
University Dickinson School of Law. I am indebted to Jamison Colburn and David Kaye
for their thoughtful comments, and to the participants at the Mid-Atlantic Law and Society
Association’s Conference on Law, Society, and the Social Good for their feedback.
1
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 757, 759 (1994) (calling the Court’s case law “an embarrassment” and a “doctrinal
mess”); Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits
of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973) (“The fourth amendment cases are a mess!”);
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 375 (comparing the exclusionary rule to “swiss cheese”); Potter Stewart, The Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1983) (describing the
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Court’s failure to agree on a doctrinal framework for the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Although it is well accepted that the Court now treats the exclusionary
remedy as exclusively deterrence-driven,2 the Court has not articulated a coherent
theory explaining how it expects exclusion to deter unconstitutional searches and why
it considers deterrence a worthy goal. Further complicating the analysis, the Court has
recently injected the concept of police culpability into the deterrence calculus.3
Nowhere is this lack of analytical rigor more striking than in the so-called “good
faith” cases. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, initially recognized in
United States v. Leon,4 has now been part of the Fourth Amendment legal landscape
for almost thirty years. Scholars and dissenting Justices have offered trenchant, at times
withering, critiques of Leon and its early progeny,5 and now of the Court’s three recent
forays into this area—Hudson v. Michigan,6 Herring v. United States,7 and Davis v.
exclusionary rule as “a bit jerry-built—like a roller coaster track constructed while the roller
coaster sped along”).
2
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (“The rule’s sole
purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police
misconduct . . . .”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“[T]he rule’s prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to
deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). For a discussion of other purposes that have previously animated the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence, see infra notes 183–89 and
accompanying text.
3
See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29; Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701–04 (2009).
4
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
5
For critiques of Leon and the good-faith exception, see, for example, Donald Dripps,
Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Wayne R. LaFave, “The Seductive Call of
Expediency”: United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895;
William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981). But cf. Sharon
L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1329–34
(2000) (defending the good-faith exception as consistent with her characterization of the
exclusionary rule as a sanction rather than a price).
6
547 U.S. 586 (2006) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the knockand-announce requirement). For critical commentary, see, for example, Albert W. Alschuler,
The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1741 (2008); Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan:
Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035 (2008);
Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, The Exclusionary Rule, and The Roberts Court:
Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.–KENT L.
REV. 209 (2010); David A. Moran, Waiting for the Other Shoe: Hudson and the Precarious
State of Mapp, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1725 (2008); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule
Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567 (2008); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and
the Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819 (2008).
7
129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in cases
of “nonrecurring and attenuated negligence”). For critical commentary, see, for example,
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United States.8 And others have more generally despaired completely of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy as a deterrent,9 at times advocating alternative remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations.10
Stepping back from the well-deserved criticism leveled at the Court’s rulings in
these individual cases, and while questions surrounding the wisdom—and, perhaps
more important, the political feasibility—of alternative proposals remain unresolved,11
Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
463 (2009); David H. Kaye, Unraveling the Exclusionary Rule: From Leon to Herring to
Robinson—and Back?, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 207 (2011) http://www.uclalawreview.org
/pdf/discourse/58-11.pdf; Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009).
8
131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (applying the good-faith exception where police conducted a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest “in strict compliance with then-binding
Circuit law”). For critical commentary, see, for example, Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law,
and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077 (2011); Tracey Maclin & Jennifer
Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183 (2012).
9
See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 585, 588, 591 (2011) (citing the law and economics concepts of “selection
biases, information asymmetries, misaligned incentive structures, and substitution effects”
in finding that the exclusionary rule does not deter “under typical conditions”); L. Timothy
Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV.
669, 755 (1998) (surveying empirical studies and concluding that the exclusionary rule “is
simply inadequate as a deterrent”); Slobogin, supra note 1, at 365 (arguing that the exclusionary
rule is “significantly flawed as a deterrent device”).
10
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U.
L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2012) (relying on the exclusionary rule’s deterrent failures to defend a
return to the warrant requirement on the grounds that when “ex post remedies fail, the law turns
to ex ante alternatives”); Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 111, 115–17 (2003) (suggesting that constitutional violations lead to sentencing reductions coupled with “automatic police punishment” tied to the level of police culpability);
David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 165–86 (2009) (advocating steps
to increase police accountability, including early intervention systems, data collection, internal
discipline, citizen complaints, and improved constitutional tort remedies); Dallin H. Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 756 (1970)
(defending “an effective tort remedy” in place of the exclusionary rule); Perrin et al., supra
note 9, at 743–54 (supporting a civil administrative remedy unless the violation was intentional or willful); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
49, 54 (preferring a tort remedy because damages can be set “to yield the optimum level of
deterrence”); Slobogin, supra note 1, at 405–06 (proposing an administrative remedy that
would award liquidated damages payable by the police department for good-faith violations
and otherwise by the individual officer).
11
Although an evaluation of potential alternatives to the exclusionary rule is beyond the
scope of this Article, some commentators who have engaged in such an analysis have concluded
that the exclusionary remedy, though “flawed,” is “the best we can realistically do.” Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 847–48 (1994); see
also William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
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this Article takes the Supreme Court at its word that it cares about deterring Fourth
Amendment violations and evaluates the Court’s opinions on its own terms. After
introducing the good-faith cases in Part I, Part II explores three different models of deterrence that the Article uses in assessing the deterrence analysis found in the Court’s
decisions: economic rational choice theory, organizational theory, and the expressive
account of punishment. Part III then draws on these different theories in evaluating the
Court’s narrative on the mechanics of deterrence—i.e., how the Court expects the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct. This Part argues that the deterrence arguments the Court has advanced in this line of cases are internally inconsistent, and that
considering a police officer’s culpability in exempting negligent Fourth Amendment
violations from the reach of the exclusionary rule is not clearly called for by any of the
three theories of deterrence. Ultimately finding the questions surrounding deterrence
empirically unanswerable, Part IV then pushes back on the Court’s deterrence-driven
focus and analyzes why the Court believes deterrence is a worthy goal for the exclusionary remedy. Here the Article looks to other areas where law has a deterrent aim
and finds that they, like earlier incarnations of the exclusionary rule, also serve underlying policies that are not deterrence-based. The Article concludes that factoring in
these additional policy objectives in the exclusionary rule cases would help inform the
fashioning of the remedy by alleviating the need to rely exclusively on the speculative
concept of deterrence.
I. THE CASES
A. The Exception for Reasonable Reliance on Third Parties
The Court created the good-faith exception in its 1984 ruling in United States v.
Leon, refusing to apply the exclusionary rule where police reasonably rely on a warrant that turns out to be unsupported by probable cause and therefore constitutionally
defective.12 Explaining that the exclusionary rule is not “a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved,” the Court instead described it as “a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.”13 The Court separately considered the exclusionary rule’s potential to influence two different audiences: the judges who improperly issue warrants, and the
police officers who seek and execute them. With respect to the former group, the Court
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 871 (2000) (observing that “[t]he very factor that makes a proposed safeguard a ‘more efficacious sanction’ than exclusion will also make it unattractive
to policy makers as they look for ways to avoid exclusion’s social costs”); William J. Stuntz,
The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444
(1997) (describing the exclusionary rule as, “by a wide margin, the best legal tool available
for regulating the police”).
12
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
13
Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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advanced three rationales to explain why suppression was not necessary to incentivize
judges to exercise greater care in making probable cause determinations. First, the
Court made clear, the exclusionary remedy is “designed to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”14 Second, the Court was not
convinced that judges “are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.”15
Finally, and “most important” according to the Court, exclusion would not have “a
significant deterrent effect” on magistrates because they are not “adjuncts to the law
enforcement team,” but rather “neutral judicial officers” who have “no stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.”16
Turning to the exclusionary rule’s deterrent impact on the police, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule cannot deter “objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity.”17 More specifically, the Court reasoned that a police officer who obtains a
warrant “cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination”
and therefore “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own,
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”18 Relying on a cost-benefit balancing test that had its roots in United States v. Calandra19
but came into its own thanks to Leon, the Court concluded that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion.”20
The Court would later go on to extend the good-faith exception to three other situations it found analogous to Leon: where police reasonably relied not on a warrant, but
on a legislative enactment, a court clerk’s records, or an appellate court ruling. On each
occasion, the Court repeated Leon’s admonition that the exclusionary rule’s deterrent
focus is on law enforcement and not other state actors, and also cited the cost-benefit
test in finding insufficient justification for suppressing the illegally seized evidence in
order to deter the police.21 First, in Illinois v. Krull,22 the Court ruled that the good-faith
14

Id. at 916.
Id.
16
Id. at 916–17.
17
Id. at 919.
18
Id. at 921.
19
414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (relying on a cost-benefit analysis in refusing to extend the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings).
20
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
21
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428–29 (2011); Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 14–16 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–53 (1987). As discussed below, the
Court in Davis v. United States focused more on the lack of law enforcement culpability. See
infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. The Davis Court did not specifically recite Leon’s
observations that judges do not routinely flout the Fourth Amendment and are disinterested
decisionmakers with no stake in the outcome, but it did observe that “‘punish[ing] the errors
of judges’ is not the office of the exclusionary rule.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Leon,
468 U.S. at 916).
22
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
15
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exception protected police who acted in “objectively reasonable reliance on a statute”
authorizing warrantless searches that was later struck down as unconstitutional.23 The
Court observed that a law enforcement official “cannot be expected to question the
judgment of the legislature that passed the law,”24 explaining that excluding the proceeds of the unconstitutional search would have “as little deterrent effect” there as in
Leon.25 In Arizona v. Evans,26 the Court next applied the good-faith exception where
police, “acting objectively reasonably,” relied on erroneous information in the computer
database of a court clerk’s office which failed to indicate that an outstanding arrest warrant had been quashed.27 Then, most recently, the Court concluded in Davis v. United
States that the good-faith exception was available where police acted in “objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” that was “later overruled.”28 Exclusion in those circumstances “deters no police misconduct”29 and therefore “suppression
would do nothing to deter” the police, the Court reasoned.30 And, drawing from its earlier rulings in this line of cases, the Davis Court refused to “[p]enaliz[e] the officer for
the [appellate judges’] error.”31
The Court’s recognition of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule has
not come without controversy.32 As reflected in debates surrounding the imposition of
strict liability in tort33 and criminal law,34 the suppression of illegally obtained evidence in cases where an officer acted reasonably can create an incentive for that individual, or law enforcement generally, to use caution and err on the side of safeguarding
Fourth Amendment rights.35 Even the Leon majority acknowledged that applying the
23

Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
25
Id. at 349.
26
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
27
Id. at 16.
28
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–24 (2011).
29
Id. at 2434.
30
Id. at 2423.
31
Id. at 2429 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 350) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
33
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 534–38 (5th
ed. 1984).
34
Compare United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–53 (1922) (describing the deterrence
justification for strict liability crimes), and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1222 (1985) (“In effect we introduce a degree of strict
liability into criminal law as into tort law when a change in activity level is an efficient method
of avoiding a social cost.”), with Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 422, 423 (1958) (taking the position that an actor who is not even negligent is “nondeterrable” and calling the theory that strict liability will encourage greater care
“wholly unproved and prima facie improbable”).
35
See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
“Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 343 (1982) (arguing that suppressing evidence even in the face of good-faith mistakes “encourage[s] the taking of such additional
24
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exclusionary rule where police acted in objective good faith “might” have such a deterrent effect, but ultimately found that possibility “speculative,” concluding with a
dash of ipse dixit that the “marginal or nonexistent” deterrence that would be realized
was outweighed by “the substantial costs of exclusion.”36
Moreover, even if Leon correctly declined to suppress evidence where police went
to the trouble to obtain a warrant, the decision to extend the good-faith exception to
steps as will enhance police understanding of [constitutional] limits”); Posner, supra note 10, at
68 (pointing out that a good-faith exception “swing[s] the pendulum of the exclusionary rule
from overdeterrence to underdeterrence by removing the incentive of law-enforcement agencies
to take measures to minimize good-faith violations”); cf. David C. Gray, A Spectacular
Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 43), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2034385 (“[A]lthough it may be true that
the threat of exclusion could not have deterred the officers in Leon, there is no reason to believe that the actual infliction of exclusion against them would not secure a higher measure
of conformity to the Fourth Amendment by both them and all other officers . . . .”).
36
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 922. Reasoning that an unconstitutional search
is, by the very terms of the Fourth Amendment, “unreasonable” and a “reasonable unreasonable
search” is therefore an oxymoron, some academics have argued that there is no such beast as
an objectively reasonable Fourth Amendment violation and that the good-faith exception thus
improperly gives the prosecution two bites at the same apple. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley,
Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
211, 231 (2010) (equating “negligence” with Fourth Amendment “unreasonableness”); Gray,
supra note 35, at 43 (referring to this as “a non sequitur”); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary
Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 303
(1998) (calling it “pedantic” to differentiate between “objectively reasonable unreasonable
searches and objectively unreasonable searches”); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth
Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J.
483, 576 (2006) (charging that the Court “created a ramshackle doctrinal structure”). Admittedly,
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Leon persuasively argued that, given the specific definition of probable cause as “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . .
there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Leon majority “creat[ed] a double standard
of reasonableness” by recognizing the possibility that a police officer could ever make a reasonable mistake that this standard had been met. Leon, 468 U.S. at 976 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see id. at 975 (explaining that “when probable cause is lacking, then by definition a reasonable
person under the circumstances would not believe there is a fair likelihood that a search will
produce evidence of a crime”); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)
(instructing that the relevant inquiry in weighing probable cause is whether the “historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to . . . probable
cause”). But the same cannot be said of other Fourth Amendment violations, for the term
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment is a legal construct and not one tied to the objective
reasonable person standard like that created in Leon. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995),
for example, the arrest was unconstitutional—and thus “unreasonable”—because the arrest
warrant had been quashed, but it is not a contradiction in terms to say the officer reasonably
believed in the existence of the warrant.
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warrantless searches is open to criticism. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her dissent in Krull, legislators, unlike judges, are not neutral decisionmakers but instead
are political beings whose very purpose in enacting statutes authorizing warrantless
searches is “explicitly to facilitate law enforcement.”37 And, in fact, the history underlying the Fourth Amendment indicates that “legislative abuse was precisely the evil
the Fourth Amendment was intended to eliminate.”38 Evans is subject to challenge
on the grounds that “accurate recordkeeping in law enforcement” is of “paramount
importance,”39 and out-of-date arrest records are like “a ticking time bomb” because,
given the ease with which they are shared, they can lead to multiple arrests “‘into the
indefinite future.’”40 Finally, Davis is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
retroactivity doctrine, and, unlike the three earlier cases, it extends the good-faith
exception to circumstances where police may not consciously be acting in reliance on
third parties, even though they are acting in compliance with them.41 Moreover, Davis
discourages criminal defendants—but not prosecutors—from challenging established
search and seizure rules, thus “introduc[ing] a systemic bias into Fourth Amendment
litigation” and undermining the exclusionary rule’s role in developing the constitutional principles governing criminal procedure.42
Nevertheless, the Court had a principled basis for refusing to exclude the evidence
uncovered in these four cases. In each one, the police had acted in objective good faith,
supported by a third party independent of law enforcement, and the Court feared that
suppression would transform the exclusionary rule into “a strict-liability regime.”43
Had the Court stopped there, it would have been on relatively stable ground.
But the Court did not stop there. As discussed below, the Court has applied the
Leon analysis in creating an exception to the exclusionary rule even in cases of intentional Fourth Amendment violations and then most recently in suggesting that police
culpability greater than negligence is required to trigger exclusion.
37

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at
365–66 (“Legislators by virtue of their political role are more often subjected to the political
pressures that may threaten Fourth Amendment values than are judicial officers.”); Alschuler,
supra note 7, at 468 n.21 (reporting that the attorney who represented the state in Krull admitted that his argument that legislators are not likely to pass unconstitutional statutes was
made “tongue in cheek”).
38
Krull, 480 U.S. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
39
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 708 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40
LaFave, supra note 7, at 780–81 (quoting United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121,
1124 (D. Nev. 1975)); see also Evans, 514 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that police departments may be “in the best position to monitor” court computer databases and
“influence mundane communication procedures in order to prevent . . . errors”).
41
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2437–38 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3(h),
at 21–22 (4th ed. Supp. 2011); Kerr, supra note 8, at 1103–06.
42
Kerr, supra note 8, at 1082.
43
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29.
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B. The Exception for Even Bad-Faith Violations
In its 2006 opinion in Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court relied on Leon’s
cost-benefit analysis in deciding that the exclusionary rule would no longer apply to
violations of the Fourth Amendment’s venerable44 knock-and-announce requirement.45
In a completely gratuitous part of the opinion,46 the majority quoted from Leon in concluding that the “considerable” costs associated with “[r]esort to the massive remedy”
of exclusion exceeded the deterrent benefits in knock-and-announce cases.47
Unlike the decisions discussed in the previous section, however, the Hudson Court
could not rely on Leon’s principal argument that objectively reasonable police behavior is not susceptible to deterrence because Hudson created a blanket exception to the
exclusionary rule, irrespective of the police officer’s culpability. After Hudson, even
bad-faith violations of the knock-and-announce rule do not trigger exclusion.48 Rather,
the Court reasoned that “the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act” and here “[m]assive deterrence is hardly required”
because a violation of the knock-and-announce rule (unlike the warrant requirement)
is unlikely to lead to the discovery of additional evidence.49
Furthermore, the Court refused to “assume” that the exclusionary rule acts as a
significant deterrent “simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago.”50 Reluctant to “forc[e] the public today to pay for the sins
and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost half a century ago” when Mapp
was decided,51 the Court maintained that victims of knock-and-announce violations
can now find “meaningful relief” in constitutional tort litigation and that “the increasing professionalism of police forces” discourages Fourth Amendment violations.52
44

See David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 296 & n.62
(accusing the Court of “effectively killing an 800-year-old rule” that “actually may date to
the era of the Magna Carta”).
45
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594–96 (2006).
46
The Court independently justified its ruling on the grounds that knock-and-announce
violations are “not a but-for cause of obtaining” evidence, and, using a novel concept of
“[a]ttenuation,” that “the exclusionary rule is inapplicable” because “[t]he interests protected
by the knock-and-announce requirement . . . have nothing to do with the seizure of the
evidence.” Id. at 592–94 (emphasis omitted). For additional discussion of the Court’s attenuation analysis, see infra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
47
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599.
48
See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1775 (describing Hudson as creating “a subjectively
unreasonable bad faith exception to the [exclusionary] rule”).
49
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596.
50
Id. at 597.
51
Id. (discussing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which incorporated the exclusionary
rule and made it binding on the states).
52
Id. at 597, 598. Others have convincingly responded to the Court’s disingenuous arguments about the viability of alternatives to exclusion, including several authors who objected
that the Hudson majority cited their work out of context. See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE
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C. The Exception for Negligent Violations
Three years later, in Herring v. United States, the Court entertained a more Leonlike case, in fact, one that raised a question explicitly left open in Arizona v. Evans—
whether the good-faith exception applies where “police personnel” rather than court
employees are at fault for failing to update a computer database to indicate that an outstanding arrest warrant has been quashed.53 In Herring, the mistake in question originated from the sheriff’s office in a neighboring county, enabling the Court to observe
that the officer who actually arrested Herring “did nothing improper.”54 But rather than
extend Leon to cases where police reasonably rely on officers from another jurisdiction
(perhaps because doing so would run afoul of the Court’s treatment of law enforcement
as a single entity),55 the Court broadly pronounced that the exclusionary rule would not
apply to “[a]n error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence.”56
“To trigger the exclusionary rule,” the Court explained, “police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”57 This dual focus
on “the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police
conduct” led the Court to conclude that the exclusionary remedy “serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or
systemic negligence.”58
MISCONDUCT v n.1 (3d ed. 2009) (describing as “highly misleading” Hudson’s citation of their
book in the discussion of constitutional tort remedies); Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing,
Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at M5 (accusing the Court of “twist[ing]” his argument that
the exclusionary rule “played a pivotal role in stimulating [police department] reforms” and
concluding that Hudson “marks a dangerous step backward in removing a crucial component
of [the remedial] mix”).
53
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 16 n.5 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
Id. at 700.
55
See id. at 699–700 (admitting that “[i]n analyzing the applicability of the [exclusionary]
rule, Leon admonished that we must consider the actions of all the police officers involved”);
LaFave, supra note 7, at 772–75. But cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Essay, Trawling for Herring:
Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 685 (2011)
(arguing that Herring “pars[ed] . . . relative fault among various law enforcement actors, in
lieu of considering law enforcement conduct as a collective whole”).
56
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. The Herring Court did not define the concept of “attenuation,”
and commentators have taken conflicting positions on its meaning and the extent to which it
restricts the reach of the Court’s holding. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 478–81; Craig M.
Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2012);
LaFave, supra note 7, at 770–83. In its subsequent decision in Davis, however, the Court’s
description of Herring failed to even mention the term, making it less likely that attenuation
will serve as a meaningful limit on Herring’s exemption for negligent violations. See Davis v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–29 (2011).
57
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
58
Id. at 698, 702.
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In response to the four dissenters’ argument that the majority’s decision contradicted “a foundational premise of tort law,”59 the Chief Justice dropped a footnote
explaining that the majority did “not quarrel with [the] claim that ‘liability for negligence . . . creates an incentive to act with greater care’” and did not mean to “suggest
that the exclusion of this evidence could have no deterrent effect.”60 Nevertheless, the
Court continued, with another dose of ipse dixit, “our cases require any deterrence to
‘be weighed against the substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule,’ and
here exclusion is not worth the cost.”61 In cases like Herring, the Court concluded,
“when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather
than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal
deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’”62
Predictions that Herring would be read narrowly were proven wrong by the Court’s
2011 ruling in Davis v. United States. Unlike Herring, Davis fell more squarely within
Leon’s ambit because, as discussed above, the police officers there were relying not
on other law enforcement officials but on judicial precedent allowing warrantless automobile searches.63 But instead of merely reiterating the common rationale underlying
Leon, Krull, and Evans, the Davis majority gave a “ringing endorsement” to the notion
of culpability introduced in Herring.64 Interspersing quotations from Herring and
Leon, the Davis Court said:
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence
benefits of exclusion “var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct” at issue. When the police exhibit “deliberate,”
“reckless,” or “grossly negligent” disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends
to outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act with an
objectively “reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct is
lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, “isolated”
negligence, the “deterrence rationale loses much of its force,” and
exclusion cannot “pay its way.”65
59

Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 702 n.4 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
61
Id. at 702–03 n.4 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987)).
62
Id. at 704 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6 (1984)). Although the
Herring opinion quoted extensively from Leon, it is not a good-faith case because the officers
who maintained the computer database were concededly negligent and did not act in an objectively reasonable manner. Nevertheless, some commentators—as well as the Court itself—
have mistakenly aligned Herring with the good-faith rulings. See Davis v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (implying that Herring is the “[m]ost recent[ ]” application of Leon);
Kerr, supra note 8, at 1105.
63
See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425–26.
64
Maclin & Rader, supra note 8, at 1189.
65
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701, 702; Leon, 468 U.S.
at 909; Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698; Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 n.6, 919) (internal quotation marks
60
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Resurrecting Herring’s distinction between negligent and more culpable police misconduct was entirely unnecessary, of course, because—just as in Leon, Krull, and
Evans (but not Herring)—the officers in Davis were not even negligent.66 The Court
need have gone no further than to recite Leon’s tripartite justification for analyzing only
the exclusionary rule’s deterrent impact on law enforcement and then to explain that the
police in Davis could not be deterred because they were “not culpable in any way.”67
The remainder of the Article evaluates the Court’s deterrence analysis in this line
of cases and, in particular, its recent reliance in Herring and Davis on the concept of
police culpability to exempt negligent violations from the reach of the exclusionary
remedy. Before doing so, however, the next section explores three distinct models
of deterrence that are then used in analyzing the Court’s decisions.
II. THE DETERRENCE THEORIES
Not surprisingly, the mechanics of deterrence, like other questions of human
behavior, are subject to considerable dispute. In fact, commentators across the political spectrum representing a variety of jurisprudential disciplines have acknowledged
that deterrence is not susceptible to empirical proof and thus at some level is largely a
matter of conjecture.68 In assessing the Court’s work on deterrence in the good-faith
cases, this Article considers three models of deterrence that have particular relevance
to criminal procedure and the exclusionary rule: economic rational choice theory,
organizational theory, and the expressivist account of punishment.
According to the rational choice theory favored by economists, we are all rational
actors seeking to maximize our own utility. Risk-neutral offenders will therefore commit a crime—or police will infringe Fourth Amendment rights—when the expected
utility of the violation exceeds the expected disutility of the punishment. As a result,
the law deters unwanted behavior when the severity of the penalty, discounted by the
omitted); see also id. at 2428 (relying on Herring’s references to gross negligence and recurring negligence in applying Supreme Court precedent to the facts of Davis).
66
See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
67
Id. For a description of Leon’s three-part analysis, see supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
68
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2008) (“Quantifying the behavioral effects of the exclusionary
rule is . . . impossible.”); Heffernan, supra note 11, at 864 (observing that “a deterrent effect . . .
is extremely hard to verify, particularly when police illegality is at issue”); Dan M. Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 427–28 (1999) (discussing “the
empirically speculative nature of deterrence”); Perrin et al., supra note 9, at 755 (“The dynamic of deterrence, steeped as it is in the motivations of fallible human beings, defies precise
measurement . . . .”); Posner, supra note 10, at 54 (“No one actually knows how effective the
exclusionary rule is as a deterrent . . . .”); Slobogin, supra note 1, at 368 (concluding that “[n]o
one is going to win [this] empirical debate”).
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probability that the penalty will actually be imposed, outweighs the expected gain to
the wrongdoer.69 Under this theory, the exclusionary rule discourages an unconstitutional search if the loss of the evidence discovered, multiplied by the likelihood of exclusion, exceeds the value of the evidence the police anticipate finding. Deterrence can
occur on either a specific or a general level, affecting either the particular police officer who conducted the search in question or law enforcement officials as a whole.70
Organizational theory, by contrast, criticizes rational choice theory for ignoring the
impact organizations play in influencing individual actions. According to this account,
the structure and culture of an institution “frame . . . the situation” for its agents, such
that they are “no longer acting as isolated rational individuals,” “engaging in a rational
actor calculus.”71 Instead, they function as “part of a larger structure,” “absorbed in a
larger cause,” with the result that “the organization’s rationality—its goals and means—
dominates” in a way that may escape the attention of any one individual.72 This process can then create “a recipe for organizational wrongdoing that will never trouble
the conscience of anyone within the organization.”73 Illustrative of this theory, police
culture and its infamous “thin blue line” have created “a set of informal, cultural norms
that are unique to the occupation of policing [and that] largely determine street-level
69

See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 166–67, 169–70 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Athlone Press
1970) (1823); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176–77 (1968); Posner, supra note 10, at 54. For criticisms of this theory that have
particular relevance to the exclusionary rule, see, for example, Kahan, supra note 68, at 427–28
(warning that “[w]e will rarely have reliable information” on the necessary variables); Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1077–80, 1091–93 (2000)
(pointing out that individuals often cannot process the amount of relevant information necessary to make rational decisions and are likely to underestimate the risk of getting caught);
Slobogin, supra note 1, at 372 & n.24 (arguing that police are not likely to “make the kinds
of dollars-and-cents calculations that [this theory] hypothesizes”).
70
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 918–19 (referring to both specific and general deterrence, and
analyzing the exclusionary rule’s “‘systemic’ deterrent on a wider audience”); Dripps, supra
note 6, at 219–22 (arguing that these calculations are more likely to be made by police administrators rather than individual officers, and setting out an equation that also includes nonevidentiary benefits, opportunity costs, and civil liability costs).
71
V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Responsibility and Risk in Organizational Crimes
of Obedience, 14 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 49, 64, 66 (1992).
72
Id. at 66; cf. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction
Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 554 (1981) (pointing out that organizational agents are
“subject to bounded rationality” and sometimes “given to opportunism”).
73
David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2348, 2355 (1992) (also noting that “[t]he division of labor is equally a division of knowledge”);
see also Hamilton & Sanders, supra note 71, at 77 (discussing “the problem [of] piercing together the knowledge and behavior of several employees . . . even though no single employee
knowingly broke the law”).
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police conduct.”74 Organizational theory therefore teaches that the exclusionary rule
cannot hope to influence police behavior unless it speaks to police culture and leads to
structural change.75 Because this culture is not exclusively the creation of high-ranking
police department officials, institutional reform requires not only “top-down pressure”
but also “‘buy in’ from the ground up.”76
Finally, some academics have linked deterrence to philosophy’s expressive theory of punishment, which emphasizes that criminal punishment sends a message of
“society’s authoritative moral condemnation.”77 According to this account, punishment
influences conduct by making criminal behavior not only more costly (as the economists emphasize) but also less desirable. This so-called “moralizing” or “educative”
effect of punishment works through “preference adaptation,” whereby individuals, seeking to avoid the cognitive dissonance they feel when grouped with law-breakers, “internalize dispositions, outlooks, and tastes that conform to the social norms expressed in
criminal prohibitions.”78 Although others have focused on the expressive function of
74

Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 453, 512 (2004); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 41, 42–43,
50 (3d ed. 1994) (attributing police officers’ distinctive “working personality” and “unusually
high degree of occupational solidarity” to the danger, isolation, and authority characterizing
their work); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 14 (2005)
(discussing the importance of “address[ing] underlying organizational and management causes”
of law enforcement misconduct); Taslitz, supra note 36, at 552–61 (analogizing police culture
to corporate culture); John Van Maanen, Observations on the Making of Policemen, 32 HUM.
ORG. 407, 408 (1973) (describing the “distinct [police] subculture” and law enforcement’s
“outsider role in the community”).
75
See Armacost, supra note 74, at 545–46 (pointing out the need for “systemic” remedies
rather than “individual-specific” ones); cf. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2011)
(noting that the exclusionary rule’s deterrent impact depends on “‘alter[ing] the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments’” (quoting Leon, 468
U.S. at 916)); Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 n.20 (observing that “‘[t]he key to the [exclusionary] rule’s
effectiveness as a deterrent lies . . . in the impetus it has provided to police training programs
that make officers aware of the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment and emphasize the
need to operate within those limits’” (quoting Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412 (1977)));
Laurin, supra note 55, at 684 (interpreting Herring’s reference to “‘systemic negligence’”
as endorsing a view of the exclusionary rule “expressly aimed at institutional, in addition to
individual, misconduct” (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702, 704 (2009))).
76
Armacost, supra note 74, at 521, 546; cf. Van Maanen, supra note 74, at 412 (reporting
that new police officers are often advised by veteran colleagues that what they were taught at
“the police academy . . . has little, if anything, to do with real police work”).
77
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 352 (1996). See generally JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function
of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95,
95–118 (1970); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 370–80 (1981).
78
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 77, at 356; see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 603 (1996). But cf. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive

2013]

CULPABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

835

criminal punishment, expressive theory seems to have valuable lessons for criminal
procedure as well: the exclusionary rule can be viewed as conveying a message that
society condemns Fourth Amendment violations, in hopes of altering the preferences
of police officers by “instilling” in them an “aversion[ ]” to unconstitutional searches.79
The next section takes the Supreme Court at its word that the exclusionary rule’s
sole function is to discourage Fourth Amendment violations. It then uses these three
theories to evaluate the Court’s deterrence analysis in the Leon line of cases.
III. THE MECHANICS OF DETERRENCE
Given the empirical uncertainties and theoretical differences reflected in the
varying models of deterrence described in the prior section, the Supreme Court can
hardly be faulted for failing to articulate an ironclad theory as to precisely how the
exclusionary rule works to deter constitutional violations. Nevertheless, evaluating the
good-faith decisions on their own terms, their deterrence analysis is subject to criticism on two separate grounds. First, the Court seems to conveniently cherry-pick
among different deterrence arguments in order to justify the outcome it wants to reach
in a particular case. Second, the concept of culpability the Court recently injected into
its deterrence analysis in recognizing an exception for negligent violations is not called
for by the three theories of deterrence described above. The discussion that follows
takes up these points in turn.
A. The Incoherence of the Deterrence Analysis
Examination of the deterrent arguments advanced in the Court’s various good-faith
rulings reveals a number of internal inconsistencies. This section considers three of
them: what type of police culpability the exclusionary rule can hope to deter; whether
suppression underdeters or overdeters; and what relevance a police officer’s subjective
state of mind has to the deterrence calculus.
First, the Supreme Court’s recent suggestion in Herring and Davis that the exclusionary rule offers insufficient deterrent value in cases of “simple, ‘isolated’ [police]
negligence”80 conflicts not only with well-established tort law principles, but also with
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1417 (2000) (arguing that
“[t]he criterion of deterrence, because it is causal, is necessarily nonexpressive,” and therefore
“[a] deterrent account of expressive penalties . . . is not a genuine expressive theory”).
79
Kahan, supra note 78, at 603; see Davies, supra note 5, at 1280 (characterizing the exclusionary rule as a sanction in part because it is “designed to communicate society’s view that
police violations of constitutional rights are wrongful”); cf. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 4 (2006) (viewing the Fourth Amendment as “taming . . .
expressive political violence” on the part of the state).
80
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (quoting Herring v. United States,
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the Court’s own precedent. Leon itself recognized an exception only for non-negligent
police conduct, and in fact cited to prior decisions acknowledging the exclusionary
rule’s ability to deter negligent Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, for example, the
Leon Court noted, “[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct.”81 The
circumstances where “‘the deterrence rationale loses much of its force,’” Leon made
clear, are not where the police are “simply” negligent, but where they act “‘in complete
good faith.’”82 Given the rule’s deterrent purpose, the Court continued in a similar vein,
the suppression remedy requires that the officers “had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge,” that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.83
This language would appear later in Krull and, surprisingly, in Herring as well even
though it fails to support the majority’s broader exemption for negligence: officials who
can be “charged with knowledge” are those who should have realized they were acting
unconstitutionally, i.e., those who were negligent.84 The Court’s refusal in Herring
and Davis to apply the exclusionary rule to negligent Fourth Amendment violations
thus represents a departure from its earlier precedents.
Moreover, in extending the good-faith exception to legislators in Illinois v.
Krull, the Court made the opposite claim that the exclusionary rule cannot hope to
deter Fourth Amendment violations at the other end of the culpability spectrum—
deliberate, intentional ones. Acknowledging the possibility that “some legislators”
might choose to vote in favor of unconstitutional legislation “for political purposes,”
the Krull Court expressed “doubt as to whether a legislator possessed with such fervor, and with such disregard for his oath to support the Constitution, would be significantly deterred” by the exclusionary rule.85 By contrast, as noted above in the previous
paragraph, the Court took a contrary position in Leon and presumed that the exclusionary rule can discourage intentional Fourth Amendment violations, observing that
exclusion’s deterrent aim “necessarily assumes . . . willful, or at the very least negligent conduct” on the part of the police.86 Thus, the Court’s good-faith rulings have
129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009)). For discussion of academic authority concluding that negligent
misconduct can effectively be deterred, see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
81
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82
Id. (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447, and Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539).
83
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348–49 (1987).
85
Krull, 480 U.S. at 352 n.8. Although the Court’s comment was referring to legislators
rather than law enforcement officials, its argument seemed to hinge on the level of the individual actor’s culpability rather than the particular office she held.
86
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (emphasis added) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447, and Peltier,
422 U.S. at 539) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice White, the author of the majority
opinion in Leon and an early proponent of the good-faith exception, similarly noted in a prior
dissent that “[s]ome policemen simply do act in bad faith, even if for understandable ends, and
some deterrent is needed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 169 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
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not adopted a consistent view on the level of culpability the exclusionary rule can be
expected to deter.
Second, Herring’s claim that the exclusionary rule cannot meaningfully deter simple negligence is inconsistent with the Court’s oft-stated fear that strictly enforcing
the exclusionary remedy will overdeter the police. The overdeterrence concern was
mentioned in passing in Leon as the Court observed that suppressing evidence in
cases where police acted reasonably “can in no way affect [the officer’s] future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.”87 But overdeterrence has received more attention in some of the Court’s subsequent rulings. Reiterating the point
made in Leon and quoted above, the Court’s most recent opinion in Davis v. United
States devoted a paragraph to overdeterrence, saying pointedly that “[a]bout all that
exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police work.”88 And in Hudson v.
Michigan, the Court listed as one of the costs of suppressing evidence uncovered following a knock-and-announce violation the risk that police “would be inclined to wait
longer than the law requires” before entering to execute a warrant.89 The Court can’t
have it both ways—the exclusionary rule cannot both underdeter and overdeter at the
same time.90
In addition to raising the specter of overdeterrence as one of the costs of exclusion, Hudson’s discussion of the deterrent benefits of suppression was very different
from the deterrence analysis in the Court’s other decisions. Unlike each of the other
opinions in the Leon line of cases, Hudson did not mention the police officers’ lack of
culpability. And, in fact, there was good reason for this omission because the exception created in Hudson covers even deliberate noncompliance with the knock-andannounce requirement. Rather, as noted above, the Court’s deterrence rationale in
Hudson was that “the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive
to commit the forbidden act,” and police have little to gain by foregoing the precaution
of knocking because they are likely to uncover the same evidence even if they faithfully follow the rule.91 Not only is this reasoning inconsistent with the overdeterrence
argument (made just one paragraph earlier in the Hudson opinion) that the exclusionary rule incentivizes the police to wait too long before entering, thus leading to
“preventable violence against officers . . . and the destruction of evidence,” it differs
from the deterrence rationale relied on in the Court’s other opinions and is contradicted by classic economic theory.92
87

Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15
(1995) (quoting the same language); Krull, 480 U.S. at 349 (quoting the same language).
88
131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011).
89
547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006).
90
See Laurin, supra note 55, at 710 (charging that this reasoning “add[s] a heads-I-win,
tails-you-lose dimension to cost-benefit analysis”).
91
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596.
92
Id. at 595.
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Conceding that the expected gain of violating the Constitution, the “strength of the
incentive” in the Hudson Court’s terms,93 is a relevant factor in the deterrence analysis,
it is only one side of the equation. Holding constant the other side of the equation—the
loss occasioned by exclusion, discounted by the likelihood of that loss—the Court is
correct that a lesser penalty can achieve the same level of deterrence if the expected
gains are lower.94 But the Court does not hold the other side of the equation constant;
in fact, by making the exclusionary rule unavailable for knock-and-announce violations,
it reduces both the loss and the likelihood of that loss to zero. Thus, after Hudson, the
rational police officer will have no reason to knock and announce because any gain
that might be realized from failing to do so, no matter how trivial, will easily outweigh
the cost of compliance.95
The final inconsistency reflected in the Court’s deterrence analysis in these cases
is the introduction of the concept of culpability in the two most recent opinions, Herring
and Davis. Notwithstanding the Court’s protestations in Davis that the link between
culpability and deterrence represents “[t]he basic insight of the Leon line of cases,”96 in
fact it was the creation of the Court’s ruling in Herring.97 Herring itself purported to
draw precedential support from a statement in Leon that was taken out of context,98 a
93

Id. at 596.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
95
Cf. A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive
to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 104 (1989) (explaining that an actor who “will not
be sued whether or not he obeys the law . . . obviously will not obey the law [because] obeying the law would cost him . . . but would not benefit him” (emphasis omitted)). For other criticisms of Hudson’s deterrence analysis, see, for example, Gray, supra note 35, at 68 (observing
that even if knock-and-announce violations are “not . . . motivated by an interest in seizing
evidence,” exclusion would “serve as a significant general deterrent capable of effecting systemic conformance with the knock-and-announce requirement”); Tomkovicz, supra note 6,
at 1829 n.52 (pointing out that a police officer’s “objectively unsupportable, but nonetheless
genuine, fear” that knocking will be met with violence “could provide a stronger incentive than
the discovery of evidence” for failing to comply with the knock-and-announce rule).
96
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011).
97
See id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that, under the Court’s precedents,
an officer’s culpability “is not itself dispositive” but is only “relevant because it may inform”
the deterrence analysis).
98
The Herring majority quoted Leon for the proposition that “‘an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus’ of applying the
exclusionary rule.” Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (quoting United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (noting that “[i]n a line
of cases beginning with United States v. Leon, we also recalibrated our cost-benefit analysis
in exclusion cases to focus the inquiry on the ‘flagrancy of the police misconduct’ at issue”
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 911)). But the Court failed to note that this portion of the Leon
opinion was not discussing the exclusionary remedy generally. Rather, it was describing the
law governing a specific Fourth Amendment rule—the attenuation exception to the fruits of
the poisonous tree doctrine—in the course of listing various exceptions to the reach of the
exclusionary rule.
94
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quotation from Krull that directly contradicted its ruling,99 and an earlier decision that
involved the “separate” question whether a substantive Fourth Amendment violation
had been proven,100 not the remedial question before the Court in Leon and Herring.101
In a last-ditch effort to find precedent for requiring more than simple negligence to
trigger exclusion, the Herring majority claimed that since Leon it had not suppressed
evidence in a case “where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable”
than the “nonrecurring and attenuated negligence” present on the facts of Herring.102
But this statement cannot be squared with rulings like Kyllo v. United States103 and the
2011 Term’s United States v. Jones,104 which found that the police had conducted a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by using, respectively, a thermal imager and a GPS device. Given the split in lower court authority in both cases,105
99

See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995) (rejecting as
“dubious” the “precedential value” of an earlier decision that involved the substantive question
whether police had violated the Fourth Amendment, noting that the Court no longer “treated
identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule” but instead considered “the issue of exclusion . . . separate from whether the
Fourth Amendment has been violated”). For further discussion of the Court’s decision to separate the substantive and remedial aspects of the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 169–72
and accompanying text.
101
The Court’s opinion in Herring cited by way of “analogy” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978), which held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by the refusal to hold an
evidentiary hearing so that a defendant can challenge the veracity of the affidavit police filed
to obtain a warrant absent “allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the
truth.” Id. at 171; see Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703; see also Alschuler, supra note 7, at 487 (pointing out that Franks raised an “issue of deference to a prior judicial decision” and therefore
“the analogy between Franks and Herring was not close”); LaFave, supra note 7, at 767 (noting
that Franks was based on the Court’s desire to avoid a “disfavored,” “lengthy, time-consuming
evidentiary hearing”); Laurin, supra note 55, at 681–82 (describing Franks as “an outlier . . .
deeply rooted in analysis of the historical and functional role of the magistrate”).
In addition to its attempt to find support in Supreme Court precedent, the Herring Court
also relied on a dissenting opinion as well as a law review article written in the wake of Mapp
by Judge Henry Friendly, an outspoken critic of the incorporation doctrine and the exclusionary
rule. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 953 (1965)).
102
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. The Court repeated a milder version of this comment in Davis,
stating that “in 27 years of practice under Leon’s good-faith exception, we have ‘never applied’
the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police
conduct.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702). Subject to the qualifier
discussed in the remainder of this paragraph in the Davis opinion—that “nonculpable” police
conduct involves reasonable reliance on an independent third party—Davis’s statement accurately described the Leon line of cases. See id.
103
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
104
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
105
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 46 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing lower court opinions); 1
LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 2.2(e), at 495 (4th ed. 2004) (observing that the Court’s decision
100
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it is hard to argue that the officers who conducted the searches in Kyllo and Jones
acted with a culpability greater than negligence.106
To be sure, in a limited sense Leon did introduce an element of culpability into the
exclusionary rule analysis, but only so far as to create an exception confined to circumstances where the police lack any culpability whatsoever. But declining to impose
strict liability—and then only for the narrow category of cases where police rely on
an independent third party—is a far cry from giving culpability center stage in determining the scope of the exclusionary rule or adopting a sliding scale remedy depending on the extent of police culpability.107 For example, despite proposals advanced by
some academics, the Court has not seen fit to impose more severe sanctions on badfaith violations of the Fourth Amendment.108 And, as described above, a discussion of
the officers’ culpability in violating the knock-and-announce requirement in Hudson
was conspicuously absent.
Moreover, even if Leon did envision a role for culpability in determining the reach
of the exclusionary remedy, the standard adopted in Herring is quite different from the
“objective” “standard of reasonableness” articulated in Leon and its earlier progeny.109
Notwithstanding the “good-faith” moniker, the Leon Court refused to allow “subjective
good faith” on the part of the police to justify the use of illegally seized evidence for
fear that “the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion
of the police.”110 Rather, Leon expressly cautioned that the “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer
would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”111
in Kyllo disagreed with an “overwhelming majority” of lower courts); id. § 2.7(e), at 168
(Supp. 2011) (citing conflicting lower court decisions predating Jones).
106
This is not to say that Leon should be extended to such cases. Doing so would mean, as
Justice Breyer pointed out in his Davis dissent, that the good-faith exception would “swallow
the exclusionary rule.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107
But cf. Davies, supra note 5, at 1316–17 (resting her argument that the Court views
police culpability as relevant to the exclusionary rule entirely on Leon).
108
Cf. John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 123 (1982) (taking
the position that “searches and seizures must be ‘subjectively’ as well as ‘objectively’ constitutional”); Davies, supra note 5, at 1324–29 (suggesting that evidence derived from deliberate unconstitutional searches should not be subject to the Court’s cost-benefit balancing
test); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing the Fourth Amendment Scales:
The Bad-Faith “Exception” to Exclusionary Rule Limitations, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 21, 21–23
(1993) (arguing that the Court’s division of Fourth Amendment intrusions into “good-faith”
and “[a]ll other violations” is “too crude,” and proposing recognition of a third category—“badfaith violations”—that would trigger “a broader, less constrained exclusionary rule”).
109
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 n.20 (1984); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (“As we emphasized in Leon, the standard of reasonableness we adopt is
an objective one; the standard does not turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers.”).
110
Leon, 468 U.S. at 915 n.13 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (admitting
that the term “good faith” was “perhaps confusing[ ]” as a reference to an objective standard).
111
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
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In Herring, by contrast, although the Court quoted Leon’s objective standard
and claimed that it was similarly calling for an objective “analysis of deterrence and
culpability . . . not an ‘inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers,’”112
once the Court tread beyond negligence (or perhaps gross negligence113) and into the
realm of “reckless” and especially “deliberate” conduct, it seemed to invite a subjective inquiry that turns on a particular police officer’s actual state of mind and not that
of Leon’s “reasonably well trained officer.”114 As Justice Ginsburg’s Herring dissent
aptly noted, “[i]t is not clear how the Court squares its focus on deliberate conduct with
its recognition that application of the exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into
the mental state of the police.”115
In defending the objectivity of its analysis, the Herring majority claimed that an
officer’s “knowledge and experience” can be taken into account as one of the relevant
“circumstances” in applying an objective reasonable person test without converting the
standard to a subjective one.116 But while an inquiry focused on the reasonable police
officer with similar information and experience might arguably retain the objectivity
of a reasonable-person-under-all-the-circumstances test,117 that is a negligence standard
112

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Herring v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (No. 07-513)).
113
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1994) (equating gross negligence with
civil recklessness); LaFave, supra note 7, at 784 (suggesting that Herring intended “gross
negligence” to refer to an objective standard that required “a greater departure from the reasonable man standard”).
114
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–39 (observing that civil cases typically apply an objective
standard of recklessness whereas criminal cases use a subjective test, but then going on to
articulate a subjective standard for that civil constitutional tort case). See generally MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(a)–(c) (1985) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE]
(defining purpose, knowledge, and recklessness); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 (2010) (defining recklessness).
115
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 710 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Alschuler, supra note
7, at 485 (observing that “there is no such thing as ‘objectively deliberate wrongdoing’”).
116
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (reasoning that considering an officer’s knowledge and experience “does not make the test any more subjective than the one for probable cause, which
looks to an officer’s knowledge and experience, but not his subjective intent”). For discussion
of the conflicting positions taken by the courts on the relevance of a particular police officer’s
experience in assessing probable cause, and an argument that considering police training and
experience, and certainly knowledge, does turn the definition into a subjective inquiry, see
Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective
Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751 (2010).
117
Compare Alschuler, supra note 7, at 487 n.125 (viewing Herring as inconsistent with
Leon because “[t]he reason for hypothesizing a ‘reasonably well trained officer’ was to avoid
inquiries about the extent of ‘a particular officer’s knowledge’”), with Peter W. Low, The
Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or
Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 549 (1988) (arguing that negligence “concentrat[es]
on objective components” but also “involves a subjective inquiry” because it “involves a judgment that, based on what the actor knew, he or she should have known something else”). For
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and not one of the higher levels of culpability required by Herring.118 The point is not
that the Court’s concept of negligence was a subjective one, but that proof of reckless—
and certainly deliberate—misconduct envisions a subjective inquiry into the state of
mind of the actual officer whose actions are in question.
Professor Laurin has offered a different explanation of Herring, comparing the
discussion of objective and subjective standards in that opinion to the “similar dance”
the Court has performed in its qualified immunity jurisprudence.119 Admittedly, the
Court has expressly equated the inquiry into objective reasonableness required by
Leon’s good-faith exception with the qualified immunity defense, which is available
to police officers in constitutional tort suits unless they “violate[d] clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”120
But, again, both the good-faith exception and qualified immunity are defined by objective negligence-level standards and not subjective standards like those invoked in
Herring.121 Nevertheless, Professor Laurin suggests that the Herring Court’s decision
a general discussion of the murky line between objective and subjective standards when a
particular actor’s characteristics and circumstances are incorporated into the objective reasonable person, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 513 (1978) (“If the reasonable person were defined to be just like the defendant in every respect, he would arguably do
exactly what the defendant did under the circumstances.”); Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure
in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 133–43 (2007).
118
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (2010) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care
under all the circumstances.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 175 (defining negligence as
“a failure to do what the reasonable person would do ‘under the same or similar circumstances’”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965))).
119
Laurin, supra note 55, at 728.
120
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (articulating the qualified immunity
defense available to executive-branch officials in constitutional tort suits); see also Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004) (observing that “the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified
immunity accorded an officer” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For authorities questioning the comparison between the goodfaith exception and qualified immunity, see, for example, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368
(1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that “suppression of illegally obtained evidence
does not implicate [Harlow’s] concern” that “fairness . . . as well as public policy . . . dictates
that individual government officers ought not be subjected to damages suits for arguable constitutional violations”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 & n.23 (1984) (citing Harlow
though recognizing that “[t]he situations are not perfectly analogous”); Kerr, supra note 8, at
1110 (arguing that the two are “conceptually different” because qualified immunity focuses
on the reasonableness of “one institutional player” whereas the good-faith exception focuses
on the police “considered as a collective entity”); Laurin, supra note 55, at 676, 677 (explaining
that the process of “borrowing and convergence” between the two doctrines has had “an undesirable doubling-down effect” such that “[t]he overall mix of opportunities for constitutional
redress is reduced not once, but twice”).
121
See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 488 (equating Leon’s standard with “ordinary negligence”);
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999)
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to take into account a police officer’s information and experience does not “necessitate
examination of an official’s ‘subjective beliefs.’”122 In essence, she claims, Herring
drew a line between “motive[ ] or purpose” (which she acknowledges can “only be
proved through subjective inquiry” and is therefore “irrelevant to the qualified immunity inquiry”) and knowledge “in criminal law terms.”123 This explanation of Herring
breaks down on several levels. First, “belief” and “knowledge” are similar constructs,
and therefore examination of a police officer’s knowledge by definition seems to involve an inquiry into her beliefs.124 Second, criminal law defines both knowledge and
purpose in entirely subjective terms, and thus even an assessment of a police officer’s
knowledge strays from the objective analysis the Herring Court purported to adopt.125
And finally, even if there is some room to distinguish the “information” an officer had
from her “beliefs” and “knowledge,” Herring also speaks in terms of “deliberate” police
misconduct.126 Consistent with the Court’s general reluctance in Fourth Amendment
cases to inquire into law enforcement’s “ulterior motive,”127 Herring’s reference to
“deliberate” misconduct may not require analysis of the motivation underlying a police
officer’s action, but it does trigger an inquiry (again, a subjective one) into the police
officer’s purpose or intent.128
Thus, the role played by a police officer’s culpability is one of several points of
inconsistency evident in the deterrence rationales the Court has advanced in the
Leon line of cases. The next section goes on to evaluate whether the Herring Court
was justified in introducing an assessment of police culpability into the deterrence
analysis and exempting negligent constitutional violations from the reach of the exclusionary rule.
(observing that “[g]enerally speaking, the kind of fault required [in constitutional tort suits] is
negligence with respect to illegality”). But see Laurin, supra note 55, at 726 & n.283 (taking
the contrary view that the Court’s qualified immunity cases “approach[ ] a standard sounding
more in gross negligence or recklessness”); Taslitz, supra note 36, at 495–502 (arguing that
Leon requires more than ordinary tort negligence).
122
Laurin, supra note 55, at 728.
123
Id.
124
See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal
Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 363 (2006) (observing that “[i]t cannot, or at least should not,
be said that facts are ‘known’ to the officer if he does not believe those ‘facts’”); Kinports,
supra note 116, at 780 (arguing that any “purported distinction [between knowledge and
belief] quickly breaks down”).
125
See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 114, § 2.02(2)(a)–(b).
126
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
127
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (“We flatly dismissed the idea that an
ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification.”). But cf. Kinports,
supra note 117, at 77–95 (discussing the fluctuation between objective and subjective standards
characterizing the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
128
For an explanation of the distinction between motive and intent, see FLETCHER, supra
note 117, at 452; 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(a), at 358–60
(2d ed. 2003).
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B. The Tenuous Connection Between Culpability and Deterrence
The link the Court has recently drawn between deterrence and culpability not only
signals a change in the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence, but it may also be unwarranted. Conceding a good-faith exception for cases involving reasonable police
reliance on an independent third party, the weight of authority agrees that the law can
expect to deter negligent behavior129 and even the Herring majority acknowledged that
the exclusionary rule could have some impact on negligent misconduct.130 Moreover,
under the three accounts of deterrence described above in Part II—economic rational
choice theory, organizational theory, and expressive theory—a police officer’s culpability is of questionable relevance to the deterrence analysis.131 Accordingly, Herring’s
exemption for negligent Fourth Amendment violations does not find clear justification
in any of the deterrence models.
Rational choice theory’s support for Herring’s requirement of police culpability
greater than negligence depends on two questionable assumptions. The first is that
negligent misdeeds are harder to deter than more intentional ones. Although a number
of scholars have endorsed that position,132 others have defended the contrary view advanced in Illinois v. Krull that bad-faith violations are less deterrable.133 Resolution
of this controversy may depend on whether the exclusionary rule is primarily directed
at “good cops” or “bad cops”—those officers who are dutifully trying to comply with
the intricacies of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or those who are inclined to manipulate and circumvent those rules in order to uncover evidence.134
Even if the Herring Court made the right call on this first question, it is not
obvious what impact barriers to deterrence have on the appropriate level of sanction
under classic economic theory. Admittedly, Herring’s assumption that more severe
sanctions are necessary for behavior that is more difficult to deter seems to be the
129

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 114, § 2.02 cmt. at 243; LaFave, supra note
7, at 768–70; Posner, supra note 10, at 71.
130
See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 n.4.
131
For a discussion of the tension between the Court’s culpability requirement and its purported focus on deterrence rather than retribution, see infra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
132
See, e.g., Burkoff, supra note 108, at 112 n.208; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1537 (1984); Laurin, supra note 55, at 682–83 & n.54; Thomas
& Pollack, supra note 108, at 33.
133
See, e.g., Davies, supra note 5, at 1288 n.58 (citing sources); cf. Bradley, supra note
56, at 9 (arguing that the exclusionary rule is less likely to deter a reckless officer than a negligent one); Tomkovicz, supra note 6, at 1863 n.225 (reasoning that more culpable violations
lead to greater punishment either because they “require[ ] a more potent deterrent or because
society has a greater interest in discouraging” them). For a description of the Krull Court’s
position, see supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
134
Compare Alschuler, supra note 7, at 494 n.156 (warning that the exclusionary rule
should not lose sight of the “good cop”), and Steiker, supra note 11, at 852 (same), with
Gray, supra note 35, at 44 (taking the contrary view).
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predominant view.135 But others take the opposite approach on the ground that the
expenditure of resources on punishing less deterrable crimes is inefficient.136 Thus, if
rational choice theory is the guide, deterrability arguably “can cut either way” and the
Herring Court may have jumped too quickly to the conclusion that a lesser sanction
was appropriate for the Fourth Amendment violations it deemed harder to deter.137
Moreover, the economic account of deterrence teaches that decreasing either the
severity or the probability of the sanction lowers the cost of constitutional violations
and thus increases the likelihood that a rational police officer will flout Fourth Amendment rules. In the language of Freakonomics, “[i]ncentives are the cornerstone of modern life.”138 An exemption for negligence makes such violations costless and therefore
removes any reason for taking steps to avoid them. Furthermore, the opportunity to litigate police officers’ state of mind affords the government an additional path to prevent
suppression of illegally seized evidence. Even after losing on the substantive Fourth
Amendment issue and the good-faith exception, prosecutors can still maintain that the
constitutional violation was the product of simple negligence. Opening this door can
only serve to decrease the likelihood of exclusion, thereby diminishing the rational
police officer’s incentive to comply with the Constitution.139
The Court’s linking of culpability and deterrence finds even less support in
organizational theories of deterrence. Organizational norms and culture develop
incrementally, over time, and in complex ways. Given that “the actions of multiple
employees converge” in creating institutional culture, some of these actors may not
even be aware of what others in the organization are doing.140 As a result, the organization may well “cause unintended or inadvertent harms that go beyond the actions of
any one individual.”141
135

See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 132, at 1537 (noting that “sanctions increase” for “act[s]
indicating more resistance to deterrence”); Posner, supra note 34, at 1216 (“If our object is to
minimize the amount of crime, we must ‘charge’ more to people who value that activity more.”).
136
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 34, at 1223 (summarizing the view that for “less deterrable”
crimes, “punishment is less efficacious, less worthwhile, and therefore society should buy less
of it”); cf. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1291 (1937) (pointing out that “it is idle to argue, without qualification,
that the greater the temptation the more severe a deterrent penalty ought to be” because other
factors, such as “variations in character,” must also be considered).
137
Kahan, supra note 68, at 469.
138
STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 11 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
139
Cf. Davies, supra note 5, at 1319 (commenting that “the many restrictions placed on
the use of the [exclusionary] sanction . . . have reduced its potency”); Mertens & Wasserstrom,
supra note 5, at 388 (noting that “the cumulative effect of . . . exceptions may be great, even
though the marginal loss of deterrence . . . in a particular context may seem small”).
140
Armacost, supra note 74, at 514.
141
Id. at 514–15 (describing the problem of “fragmented knowledge”); see also Luban et
al., supra note 73, at 2383 (discussing “the great potential for harm arising from the division
of labor and fragmentation of knowledge in a corporate or bureaucratic organization”).
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Focusing only on the culpability of individual police officers, or even of the police
department as a whole, in determining the reach of the exclusionary rule and creating
an exception for negligent violations thus ignores the lessons of organizational theory
and hinders the exclusionary rule’s ability to effect institutional change. It is challenging
enough to shape individual behavior, much less to have the influence on institutional
culture required by organizational theories of deterrence. If no consequence follows
from negligent violations, police departments have little reason to try to make the difficult adjustments necessary to change their culture so as to prevent those violations.
Culpability’s relevance to the expressive account of deterrence is more open to
question. Society chooses what conduct to denounce, and it conceivably could decide
to express greater moral condemnation of intentional instances of constitutional misconduct than less culpable ones, perhaps because, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, deliberately kicking a dog is more evil than accidentally stepping on its tail.142 But more
culpable mental states do not inevitably call for greater reproach. In fact, a tension has
long existed in criminal law between those who would base assessments of blameworthiness on the amount of harm the defendant caused and those who would focus on
her state of mind.143 Here too, a police officer who deliberately ignores Fourth Amendment limits on searches may be more deserving of censure than one who makes a careless mistake in the heat of the moment. Alternatively, an officer whose unconscious
race bias leads her to routinely stop and frisk persons of color without reasonable suspicion may merit greater condemnation than one who intentionally conducts an illegal
search in order to get a particularly dangerous criminal off the streets.144 Thus, the
expressivist model of deterrence does not clearly call for exempting negligent violations from the exclusionary sanction.
Additionally, for expressivists, sanctions lose their expressive power to influence
behavior if they do not “forcefully . . . communicate society’s condemnation,” if they
“condemn . . . more ambiguously.”145 And because “actions speak louder than words,”
142

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1881) (“[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”).
143
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 117, at 237–39 (distinguishing between “harmorientation” and “act-orientation”); Hart, supra note 34, at 413, 426 (suggesting that more
culpable acts are more deserving of criminal punishment, but likewise noting that the “relative
blameworthiness” of different crimes also takes into account “the relative extent of the harm
characteristically done”); cf. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 77, at 353 (arguing that even two
intentional murders may warrant different levels of condemnation depending on the killers’
“emotional motivation” and how “reprehensible [a] message [is] implicit” in their conduct).
144
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
966 (2002) (observing that experience with the police “affects the everyday lives of people
of color”); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660, 681 (1994) (arguing that the disproportionate
number of Terry stops directed at the poor and people of color “perpetuates a cycle of mistrust
and suspicion,” thereby “widening the racial divide in the United States”).
145
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
383, 384 (1997).
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“mere verbal denunciation” tends to “trivialize the offense” and therefore is not “an
adequate substitute for hard treatment in expressing condemnation.”146 Accordingly,
a court that merely announces that police have conducted an unconstitutional search,
but then denies an exclusionary remedy and allows the prosecution to introduce the
illegally seized evidence, is less likely to succeed in influencing police behavior under
an expressive model of deterrence.147
To be sure, expressivists have argued that the law, acting expressively, can change
behavior without imposing a sanction but instead by affecting social norms.148 Given
the impact of peer pressure and social influence, we tend to follow in each others’
footsteps and the law can therefore influence behavior by changing our expectations,
our “perception of . . . others’ behaviors and attitudes.”149 By the same token, measures that merely increase penalties can be ineffective if they do nothing to alter peer
pressure and social influence. And, in fact, Professor Kahan has argued that additional
sanctions can even be counterproductive if they create the perception either that misbehavior is widespread150 or that the penalties are unjust.151
Applying these expressivist lessons to the Fourth Amendment, then, more rigorous use of the exclusionary remedy might backfire and increase the incidence of
146

Kahan, supra note 78, at 600–01.
See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 10, at 114 (pointing out that “in the absence of . . .
incentives, teaching and preaching are not going to have much of an effect” on the police);
Dripps, supra note 6, at 238 (finding that “the training the police receive seems to be more
concerned with admissibility than with legality”); LaFave, supra note 35, at 359 (observing
that the police are not “inherently evil, but rather . . . they are no less likely than the rest of us
to equate admissibility with legality”); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2543 (1996)
(noting that the police “may see little reason to continue to obey conduct rules that are consistently unenforced in criminal prosecutions”).
148
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 595
(1998) (explaining that “the law can create a social norm” and “cause most people to switch
behavior from wrong to right”); Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,
86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–51 (2000) (“[L]aw influences behavior independent of the sanctions
it threatens to impose [because] law works by what it says in addition to what it does.”).
149
Kahan, supra note 145, at 350–51, 354; see also McAdams, supra note 148, at 1652.
150
See Kahan, supra note 145, at 395 (noting that “a community is more likely to be lawabiding when its members perceive that it is”); Kahan, supra note 78, at 604 (explaining that if
people “believe that disobedience is rampant, their commitment to following the law diminishes”
because of the “‘desire not to be suckered’”).
151
See Kahan, supra note 145, at 375 (noting that if “[d]elinquency is status-enhancing” for
gang members and they “view willingness to break the law as a sign of strength and courage,”
then “‘rais[ing] the price’ of gang activity can actually reinforce the meanings that point social
influence in the direction of gang membership”); Kahan, supra note 78, at 604 (observing that
“[i]ndividuals are more disposed to obey particular laws, whether or not those laws accord with
their moral beliefs, when they perceive the criminal law as a whole to be basically just”); see also
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997)
(warning that “the criminal law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control”).
147
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constitutional violations if law enforcement officials are led to believe that unconstitutional searches are widespread and that other police officers are routinely disobeying constitutional norms, or if it confirms their view that criminal procedure is overly
solicitous of defendants’ rights and thus reinforces their siege mentality and “us v.
them” attitude.152 But imposing any sanction for Fourth Amendment violations could
conceivably backfire in this way, and the exclusionary rule may be less likely to have
such unintended consequences than alternative remedial mechanisms. Professor Kahan
has made the expressivist case for increasing the certainty and lowering the severity of
criminal penalties on the grounds that “fewer are likely to draw the initial inference that
crime pays” if punishment is more certain and making it less severe “prevents resentment from eroding the disposition to obey.”153 Studies show that police prefer the exclusionary rule because they view other sanctions, especially more direct ones, as more
onerous,154 and therefore increasing the certainty of suppression in cases where Fourth
Amendment violations are proven may send the most effective expressive message.
The exclusionary rule’s expressive function is undermined not only by the absence
of sanction but also by the mixed signals the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents
have sent. In recent years, Supreme Court opinions have painted the exclusionary rule
in a particularly unfavorable light, calling it a “bitter pill”155 and a “last resort.”156
Likewise, the Court’s suggestions that an exclusionary remedy is available only in the
“unusual” case,157 where its deterrent purposes are “‘most efficaciously served’”158
or where the defendant can clear “a high obstacle,”159 have a similar effect on the
clarity of the expressive message. And as the Court pushes its thumb with increasing
force on the scales of the cost-benefit balancing test, admonishing that “deterrent
value is a ‘necessary condition for exclusion,’ but . . . not ‘a sufficient’ one”160 and
calling for heightened proof of deterrence—deterrence that is “appreciable”161 and
152

See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 383 (relying on legitimacy-compliance theory in arguing
that police are less likely to comply with Fourth Amendment dictates because they “perceive
the present exclusionary regime to be illegitimate”); cf. Kahan, supra note 145, at 389–90
(arguing that protecting criminal defendants’ rights has a similar effect on civilians, thus
increasing crime rates).
153
Kahan, supra note 145, at 379.
154
See, e.g., Perrin et al., supra note 9, at 681, 732.
155
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (also characterizing the exclusionary
rule as “exact[ing] a heavy toll”).
156
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); see also id. at 595 & 599 (describing
exclusion as a “get-out-of-jail-free card,” an “incongruent remedy,” and a “massive remedy”).
157
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984).
158
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974)).
159
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596).
161
Id. at 2426 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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“meaningful[ ],”162 as opposed to “marginal” or “incremental”163—law enforcement
is sent a clear message that the Court is not whole-heartedly committed to the exclusionary remedy. This language does not express condemnation in the unambiguous
way necessary to influence behavior or social norms.
Under any of the three theories of deterrence described in this Article, then, it is
debatable whether police culpability should play a role in the deterrence analysis.164
The link between culpability and deterrence is weakest under the organizational account, and the question is closer under the rational choice and expressive theories. More
generally, determining how the exclusionary rule can most effectively deter Fourth
Amendment violations is largely a matter of guesswork. But the Leon line of cases, by
relying on inconsistent deterrence arguments and introducing an element of culpability
into the mix so as to eliminate any sanction for negligent violations, has hindered the
difficult task of structuring a meaningful deterrent.
Until this point, the Article has taken the Court at its word that the exclusionary
rule is aimed solely at deterrence. The next part of the Article pushes back and moves
from asking how we expect to deter unreasonable searches to why we want to do so.
IV. THE POVERTY OF DETERRENCE
In light of the indeterminacy that surrounds the mechanics of deterrence, evaluating
how the exclusionary rule can best prevent constitutional violations might be facilitated
by understanding why the Court thinks deterrence is a worthy aim. To say, as the Court
has repeatedly stated, that the exclusionary rule’s singular purpose is to “deter future
Fourth Amendment violations” is technically incomplete.165 Deterrence is not a selfdefining principle on its own: there has to be an underlying reason why society is
interested in discouraging certain behavior. Thus, for the Court to maintain that the
exclusionary rule’s sole goal is deterrence is “[c]onceptually . . . question-begging”
absent a discussion of why the Justices consider it important to encourage police
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.166
162

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702; see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (“[r]eal deterrent value”);
Herring,129 S. Ct. at 704 (“substantial” deterrence).
163
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 368; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340, 352 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
The theories are confirmed by empirical reports recounting the impact that abolishing the
exclusionary sanction has had in particular cases. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 5, at 1306–07
(citing federal law enforcement’s intentional manipulation of Fourth Amendment standing rules);
Gray, supra note 35, at 45 n.188 (describing the pre-Mapp experience in California); Sklansky,
supra note 6, at 580–81 (reporting that “[w]ithout the remedy of the exclusionary rule, the
[California] rule [prohibiting warrantless garbage searches] has evaporated” and state police
are actually “now trained to ignore it”); cf. Charles Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 109, 132–40 (1998) (discussing police training programs in California that specifically
instructed officers on the “question-first” technique of deliberately circumventing Miranda,
which the Court eventually struck down in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)).
165
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
166
Kahan, supra note 68, at 416.
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The answer to this question might seem self-evident, and in some sense it is. The
contemporary Court does not deny that an unconstitutional search is a violation of a
criminal defendant’s personal rights,167 and it sees the exclusionary rule as “removing
the incentive” to inflict similar wrongs in the future.168 But from here the narrative becomes a bit tricky. While acknowledging the invasion of constitutional rights occasioned by an unreasonable search, the Court has severed the suppression remedy from
that right, calling the substantive Fourth Amendment question a “separate” issue from
the remedial one.169 Thus, in Leon the Court observed that “the use of fruits of a past
unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’”170 Leon went
on to explicitly reject the concept of the exclusionary remedy as “a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved,”171 and the Court has repeated that sentiment,
bluntly stating in Herring that “the exclusionary rule is not an individual right.”172
Given the Court’s reluctance in other contexts to assume that constitutional lightning will strike twice in the same place,173 its concern with discouraging Fourth Amendment violations presumably refers to unreasonable searches that will be inflicted on
167

See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (noting that the exclusionary rule cannot “cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered”
(emphasis added) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 919 (referring to unconstitutional searches as
“conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
168
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (“Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in
a particular case . . . is ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’” (quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983))); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–92
(2006) (quoting the same language).
170
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354).
171
Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009); see also Davis v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (“Exclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right.’” (quoting Stone,
428 U.S. at 486)). This has not always been the Court’s view. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656 (1961) (referring to the exclusionary rule as “an essential part of the right to privacy”
and the Fourth Amendment’s “most important constitutional privilege”).
173
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (finding that the victim of an
unconstitutional chokehold did not have standing to bring an injunction action challenging the
city’s chokehold policy because he could not demonstrate “a real and immediate threat that he
would again be stopped for . . . any . . . offense, by an officer . . . who would illegally choke
him”); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–97 (1974) (likewise precluding an injunction
suit brought by a class of plaintiffs on the grounds that “[p]ast exposure” to discriminatory practices by the criminal justice system did not show a likelihood of “future injury” because the
Court assumed the plaintiffs would “conduct their activities within the law and so avoid
prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct”).
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other individuals and not the defendant herself. Thus, rather than vindicating her own
rights, a defendant who files a motion to suppress is protecting the rights of third parties
under the Court’s deterrence-driven version of the exclusionary rule. As Professor
Heffernan has observed, this vision of the exclusionary rule as exclusively a “thirdparty remedy” with “no roots in the wrong a defendant has suffered” distinguishes it
from other ex post remedies, which also tend to be “reparative” in nature.174 He analogizes the exclusionary rule to punitive damages,175 but even they are different from the
current Court’s treatment of the exclusionary rule in that they serve the added function
of imposing punishment.176
Similarly, deterrence is a familiar concept in other areas of the law, but it is not
expected to do all the work on its own. Deterrence is a common feature of criminal
law and torts, as well as constitutional torts, but it is not their exclusive purpose. When
courts are able to balance deterrent interests with other priorities, it becomes less
necessary to resolve speculative questions about deterrence in fashioning an appropriate remedy.
Thus, for example, the law of torts aims to encourage us to refrain from causing
injuries to others,177 or, to borrow from law and economics, to internalize social costs
so as to reduce those injuries to an efficient level.178 In addition to deterrence, however,
tort law is also designed to compensate injured victims, to assign the costs of injury
to the most appropriate party.179 Built on a tort model, constitutional tort suits likewise
have the twin goals of deterring future constitutional violations and compensating
victims for the loss of their rights.180
Criminal law is usually seen as serving even broader deterrent aims, to discourage
not only conduct that injures other people, but also acts that society deems wrongful
174

Heffernan, supra note 11, at 800, 801, 825; see also Laurin, supra note 55, at 704
(noting that, in the Court’s view, the exclusionary rule is “fundamentally systemic” rather
than “a ‘personal’ remedy”).
175
See Heffernan, supra note 11, at 808; cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983)
(noting that “a key feature of punitive damages [is] that they are never awarded as of right,
no matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct”).
176
See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n.9 (1986) (citing
as the purposes of punitive damages “to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior”); Wade, 461 U.S. at 54 (“Punitive damages
are awarded in the jury’s discretion ‘to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and
to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979))).
177
See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 25–26.
178
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 6–8 (1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
32–33 (1972).
179
See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 20, 24–25.
180
See, e.g., Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651
(1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255–57 (1978); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the link the Court has drawn between the good-faith exception and the
qualified immunity defense available to police officers in constitutional tort litigation).
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even if they do not directly harm others.181 In addition, all but the most die-hard utilitarians view criminal law as assessing blame for culpable conduct, even where there
is no hope of affecting future behavior.182
The exclusionary rule was not always such an outlier. Before the Court became
fixated on deterrence, it too relied on additional policy rationales to justify exclusion.
In its landmark ruling in Mapp v. Ohio,183 for example, the Court did refer to the exclusionary remedy as a “deterrent safeguard,” but its clear emphasis was elsewhere.184
Thus, the current Justices’ predecessors envisioned the exclusionary rule as necessary
to remedy constitutional violations, to prevent the Fourth Amendment from becoming
“‘a form of words’” or “an empty promise.”185 They also cited “‘the imperative of judicial integrity,’” viewing the admission of illegally seized evidence as tainting the courts
and judicial process.186 Finally, they relied on the principle that government should
obey its own laws, channeling Justice Brandeis’s warning that “‘[i]f the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.’”187 Pairing the deterrent function
181

See, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 10–12 (1988)
(listing as possible additional targets of criminal prohibition conduct that poses a risk of harm
to others, injures the public or the state, causes offense, hurts the actor herself, or is considered immoral). But see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1978) (1859) (arguing that criminal law’s only valid purpose is “to prevent
harm to others”).
182
See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 104–88 (1997).
183
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
184
Id. at 648; see also id. at 656 (noting that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is
to deter’” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))). But cf. Heffernan,
supra note 11, at 818 (reading Mapp as giving a “ringing endorsement of exclusion as a deterrent remedy”).
185
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 660 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920)); see also id. at 652 (citing “[t]he obvious futility of . . . other remedies”);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (noting that without exclusion the Fourth
Amendment would be “of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution”).
186
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222); see also Weeks, 232 U.S. at
392 (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws . . . to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which
are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution . . . .”); cf. Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty
Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 149, 149 (2012) (relying on three experimental studies in advocating “reinvigorating the integrity justification” for the exclusionary rule); Robert M. Bloom & David H.
Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving
the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 49 (2010) (criticizing the Court for having
“forgotten the importance of judicial integrity to the enforcement of constitutional rights”).
187
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)); see also
id. (“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws . . . .”). See generally Gray, supra note 35, at 18–40 (tracing the history of the Court’s
reliance on different rationales for exclusion); Heffernan, supra note 11, at 808–27 (same).
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with any of these other justifications for exclusion diminishes the need to rely on
empirically speculative notions of deterrence in structuring the exclusionary remedy.
Although there is some sentiment today among a minority of Justices to resurrect
some of these other justifications,188 the majority seems committed to deterrence and
now either ignores or rejects outright those alternative rationales for suppression.189
Moreover, the contemporary Court’s “myopic” focus on deterrence seemingly
forecloses the analogy to the compensatory and punishment aims of torts and criminal law.190 For example, the Court has consistently denied that compensation is a
purpose of the exclusionary rule, noting in Leon that “[t]he wrong condemned by
the [Fourth] Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful search or seizure
itself, and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of the
defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’”191 Although damages are similarly
incapable of curing the injury inflicted in many tort and constitutional tort cases, the
Court has reiterated that view, most recently commenting in Davis v. United States
that suppression is not “designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search” and is “‘unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispensation to
the injured criminal.’”192
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on deterrence is hard to reconcile with
the position that exclusion serves criminal law’s retributive goal of punishing or assessing blame.193 Although terms like “sanction” and “penalty” appear in the Court’s
188

See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (endorsing “a more majestic conception” of the exclusionary rule (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 608–09 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the rationale that admission of
illegally seized evidence “would seriously undermine the Fourth Amendment’s promise”).
But cf. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as Constitutional
Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that “there are no articulate
proponents on the current Court who embrace Weeks’s view that the [exclusionary] rule is
constitutionally based”).
189
See, e.g., Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598–99 (citing civil liability, “the increasing professionalism” of the police, police disciplinary procedures, and civilian review as “extant
deterrences”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984) (discounting the judicial
integrity rationale on the grounds that, inter alia, it “is essentially the same as the inquiry into
whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose” (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 459 n.35 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 908 (arguing that “[i]ndiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule . . . may well ‘generat[e] disrespect for the law
and administration of justice’” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976))).
190
Davies & Scanlon, supra note 6, at 1051.
191
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
192
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 486;
Janis, 428 U.S. at 454 n.29).
193
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he rule is not designed to be, nor
should it be thought of as, a form of ‘punishment’ of individual police officers for their failures
to obey the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.”); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 512
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descriptions of the exclusionary remedy,194 they could simply be loose synonyms or
shorthand references for exclusionary “rule” or “remedy” rather than signals that the
Court considers exclusion a form of individualized punishment. After all, the retributive concepts of condemnation and blaming look backwards at an actor’s culpability,
whereas deterrence focuses forward on the prevention of future misconduct.195
Nevertheless, the Court’s recent emphasis on police culpability in decisions like
Herring and Davis suggests a closer fit with criminal law’s blaming or retributive
function. Writing without the benefit of these opinions, Professor Davies presciently
described the exclusionary rule as a sanction aimed at deterring “harmful conduct that
is considered wrongful” by imposing “a penalty” along with a “dose of societal condemnation,” as opposed to a “price” designed to “deter only inefficient harms,” which
would allow the police to engage in “morally neutral” conduct so long as they were
willing to compensate those injured by it.196 One of her principal rationales for characterizing the exclusionary rule as a sanction was her view that Leon makes the exclusionary remedy turn on law enforcement’s culpability.197 As discussed above, I do
not believe that Leon alone supports that argument,198 and Davies acknowledged that
“[t]he triumph of the deterrence rationale . . . significantly softened the moralizing
message observable in [the Court’s] earlier exclusion decisions.”199 But the Court’s
more recent endorsement of a stronger role for culpability does suggest a model of
exclusion as a method of condemning wrongful behavior on the part of the police.200
(noting that the exclusionary rule “is not about disciplining constables by freeing criminals”
and in fact “is not about punishment at all”).
194
See Brooks Holland, The Exclusionary Rule as Punishment, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 38,
41 & nn.32–33 (2009) (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 701 (1993); Leon, 468
U.S. at 906; United States v. Payner, 444 U.S. 727, 733 n.5 (1980); Janis, 428 U.S. at 448;
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211 (1971)).
195
See Kahan, supra note 78, at 601–02 (noting that retributivism is linked to an offender’s
“‘moral culpability,’” while deterrence punishes in order to “avert[ ] future harm” (quoting
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987))); see also Gray, supra note 35,
at 52–53 (“In contrast with deterrence-only approaches, retributivism is conceptually married
to culpability as a necessary component of desert.”).
196
Davies, supra note 5, at 1277–79; see also Gray, supra note 35, at 5–6 (arguing that the
Court “justif[ies] the [exclusionary] rule as a form of punishment designed to deter”).
197
See Davies, supra note 5, at 1316–17. Her other two rationales were that unconstitutional
methods of obtaining evidence are “considered ‘wrongful’ and thus ‘prohibited’” and that the
penalty imposed by the exclusionary rule does not vary depending on the harmfulness of the
officer’s misconduct. See id. at 1293, 1318–19; cf. Taslitz, supra note 36, at 485 (maintaining
that Leon viewed exclusion “as partly serving the function of condemning the institutional
moral culpability of the police”).
198
See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
199
Davies, supra note 5, at 1301.
200
See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 464 (“Herring departs from the Court’s historic view
of exclusion by treating it as a remedy for police misconduct rather than as a remedy for

2013]

CULPABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

855

And that model tends to move the Court, seemingly unwittingly, away from a singular
focus on deterrence.201
For somewhat different reasons, the Court’s decision in Hudson also harkens back
to a version of the exclusionary rule that predates Leon. In refusing to apply the exclusionary remedy to violations of the knock-and-announce rule, the Court’s opinion in
Hudson relied in part on a novel concept of “attenuation.”202 Specifically, the Court
reasoned that exclusion could not “vindicate the interests protected by the knock-andannounce requirement” because that requirement was not intended to “shield[ ] . . .
potential evidence from the government’s eyes.”203 This rationale is reminiscent of the
pre-deterrence vision of the exclusionary rule as an individual remedy designed to compensate the defendant for a loss of rights, instead of a future-looking deterrent aimed
at protecting third parties.204
Thus, both the focus on culpability in Herring and Davis, and the attenuation reasoning in Hudson, tend to undermine the deterrence-driven view of the exclusionary
rule and resurrect the Court’s earlier alternative justifications for the rule. Placing these
other policies back on the table can help inform the structuring of the remedy, its scope
and limitations, and alleviate the need to rely exclusively on the inherently speculative
questions surrounding deterrence. This is not to say that assessing the type of sanction
necessary to further these other goals will never lead to controversy. Certainly, measurement issues can arise in determining what remedy is appropriate to compensate,
and especially to condemn, as well as to protect constitutional rights, preserve judicial
integrity, and generate respect for the law. But considering these other interests along
with the goal of deterring Fourth Amendment violations provides some welcome content to deterrence. Moreover, in the context of motions to suppress, the remedial task
is facilitated by the fact that exclusion has an either-or quality to it and does not call
for precise and variable quantification.
unreasonable searches.”). But cf. Laurin, supra note 55, at 730–31 & n.307 (agreeing that
Herring makes “highly individuated fault assessments,” but observing that the Court could
be doing so in order to deter or to punish (emphasis omitted)).
201
See Gray, supra note 35, at 31–35 (tying the Court’s earlier justifications for the exclusionary rule to retributivism).
202
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).
203
Id.
204
See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1764 (pointing out that Hudson’s attenuation reasoning was
contrary to the Court’s “denigrat[ion] [of] ‘rights’ theories of the rule”); Gray, supra note 35,
at 69 (noting that “vindicat[ion] . . . has no footing in a remedial scheme based on deterrence”
but “does resonate with a personal remedy”); Laurin, supra note 55, at 716 (observing that
attenuation is suggestive of “a rights-based understanding” of the exclusionary rule rather than
“a wholly instrumental approach”); Maclin & Rader, supra note 8, at 1227 n.209 (finding it
“incredible that Justice Scalia was unaware of the inconsistency between the conclusion that
exclusion is not a personal right and his newly announced theory in Hudson”); Tomkovicz,
supra note 6, at 1869–70 (describing Hudson as “rooted in the long-rejected notion that the
exclusionary rule is present oriented, designed to provide reparation for the person injured”).
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CONCLUSION
The resurfacing of long forgotten justifications for the exclusionary rule in some
of the Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment opinions is surely unintentional, for
a solid majority of the Justices seem committed to the view that deterrence is the sole
purpose of exclusion. But without these alternative rationales for the exclusionary
remedy, or some explanation why the Court thinks it important for the exclusionary
rule to exercise this deterrent function, deterrence simpliciter is an empty vessel devoid
of independent content. A cynic might be tempted to hypothesize that the impoverished
nature of deterrence, combined with its inherently speculative empirical quality, makes
it an easily manipulated doctrine and therefore attractive to a Court eager to cut back
on the reach of the Fourth Amendment and willing to turn to the deterrence flavor of
the week in order to do so.
Even if we take the Court at its word and evaluate the good-faith opinions with only
deterrence in mind, the recent introduction of police culpability into the equation does
not find clear support in deterrence theory, whether rational choice theory, organizational theory, or expressivist theory. Until the Court is willing to treat the exclusionary
rule like other remedies and balance the deterrent function with additional priorities, it
is left to fashion an exclusionary remedy relying exclusively on the empirically unanswerable questions surrounding deterrence. Even assuming the Court retains its singleminded focus on deterrence, however, hopefully it will at least retreat from the decision
in Herring and Davis to place law enforcement culpability front and center stage in the
deterrence calculus by requiring more than negligence to trigger the exclusionary rule.

